Weekly Briefing: What Israel’s Iran Strike Means for the Region
The US and Israel are reshaping the Middle East
Midweek, many of us, including the Iranians, were under the impression that nuclear talks in Muscat would take place on Sunday. They did not.
Instead, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iranian nuclear sites, decapitating multiple high-level IRGC officials and precipitating a wave of retaliatory strikes. At the time of writing, the situation is extremely tense. The Iranians have predictably opted out of the negotiations with the US on their nuclear programme, while Trump himself, whether he agreed with the Strike or not, has come out in favour, saying they were ‘excellent’ and that there’d be ‘more to come’.
If Israel succeeds in fully rolling back Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Middle East will be a vastly different region from what it was. And it’s already very different.
What started on October 7 – namely, the manifestation of Iranian opposition to Israeli-Saudi normalisation under the Abraham Accords - has ended with the demolition of those forces which sought to derail that exact process. Ironically, Iran's fear of Israeli-Saudi normalisation is what led to its own regional downfall, because that’s exactly what has happened. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas are either weakened or presently inactive as part of Iran’s resistance. Syria has a new government. Israel, with US backing, has a clear pathway to reshape the regional order.
The Middle East will never be the same. And for the US, it represents a major plus. Without having to worry about the threat of an Iranian regime drawing closer to Russia or China, the US can delegate regional security to Israel, Turkey and the Saudis, who, in America’s wildest dreams, all will get along swimmingly.
The good news for American strategists is that allies Turkey, Israel or the Saudis would hardly be interested in a regional war amongst themselves. Not to mention close ties with the US, each one has too much to lose – the Israelis don’t need another peer competitor, the Saudis don’t want to see their oil revenue dry up, and Turkey has enough on its plate domestically to worry about before thinking about starting anything outside its immediate sphere.
This leaves us with a vastly different Middle East – one where the Israel-Iran conflict will define the emerging regional order. So far, the Israelis are on the front foot and look likely to dominate the next steps.
From a neoclassical realist standpoint, the clash between Israel and Iran isn’t merely about nuclear capabilities or proxy networks; it's about how each state's leaders interpret their constraints and opportunities within a shifting global order.
In Israel, Netanyahu’s domestic legitimacy has been battered by months of protests and criticism over the October 7 intelligence failures. The strike on Iran reasserts Israeli deterrence and buys it critical political capital at home. In Tehran, Khamenei faces not only a faltering economy but a generational crisis of regime legitimacy. Escalation, for him, offers a means of consolidating the revolutionary narrative — but only if the regime survives it.
The international structure, increasingly shaped by US-China competition, amplifies these pressures. China’s muted response to the Israeli strike underscores its strategic caution: it needs energy from the Gulf, but it won’t jeopardise trade or global stability to shield Iran. The US, meanwhile, benefits from letting its regional allies contain threats. That’s the emerging pattern: a more delegated, interest-based US posture where trusted regional powers do the heavy lifting and take the heat.
This war, then, isn’t just a flashpoint. It’s a filter clarifying who holds power, who loses influence, and how states act when great powers step back just enough to let regional orders take shape on their own.
What I’m watching this week:
Iran’s ongoing retaliation: Will Iran escalate, and if so, will the US become increasingly involved?
US messaging: Will the White House push for de-escalation or double down on supportive ambiguity - maybe even get more heavily involved to finish off the job? Either will shape perceptions in Riyadh and Ankara.
The Gulf states’ next move: Saudi Arabia, in particular, will need to recalibrate — publicly it may denounce the strike, but privately, the door to normalisation may have just flung wide open again.
The region isn’t stabilising. It’s consolidating into a new post-Iran order. And at least for now, Israel and the US are re-drawing the map.