Weekly Briefing: Trump’s 2-Week Iran Deadline and the EU Response
How nations are scrambling to resolve the Iran nuclear impasse.
Yesterday, Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and the UK met in Geneva in a bid to break the diplomatic impasse over Iran and its nuclear programme. It’s not clear what the details are – maybe you already have a better idea by now.
Over in Washington, US President Trump has set a 2-week deadline for deciding whether to support Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites, particularly Fordow — Iran’s most secretive and protected facility, buried 90m under a mountain near Tehran. Alternatively, he may choose to hold off and let the Israelis take care of this in their own way.
So, after a week of airstrikes, here’s where everyone stands:
The US red line remains constant: Iran cannot enrich uranium. Now, the US is weighing whether to finish off what Israel started, and Trump may be testing whether Iran (in its currently debilitated state and under enormous pressure) will now agree to the terms presented before Israel’s onslaught. The US Treasury also announced a series of Iran-related sanctions, amping up the pressure on Tehran to maximum heat.
Iran has made it clear: there will be no formal talks until Israel stops its attacks and remains open to discussing ‘limits’ on its enrichment, overstepping the US red line. Despite toeing a tough line publicly, we’re aware that top Iranian officials have been in dialogue with US Envoy Steve Witkoff throughout this past week – and Iran has even pre-emptively allocated some top officials to Oman (we saw multiple Iranian government planes making their way there over the last few days).
Israel has updated its war aims to include the destabilisation of the Khamenei regime – and, ultimately, gain deep concessions from Tehran. Israel does not tolerate any Iranian enrichment and is actively taking military steps to eliminate that threat, real or perceived. Israel has made it clear that it won’t stop until it is satisfied that the threat to Israel is massively reduced.
Russia has a vested interest in a non-nuclear Iran, especially an Iran that may, sooner or later, shift leadership and drift away from the Russian and Chinese spheres of influence. However, disarming Iran militarily and on US and Israeli terms is a Russian strategist’s nightmare. Putin is likely aware of the fragility of the Iranian regime, including its domestic legitimacy problem.
China, likewise, is worried about the future of Iran, nuclear or not. Iran is a key partner for China in the Middle East, and along with Pakistan, balances a predominantly US presence in the region.
The EU + UK are eager to see Iran’s nuclear ambitions curbed; publicly, they’re calling for de-escalation, while on the sidelines, European powers are eager to see how far European diplomacy can fill the gaps left behind by Trump’s approach. For the EU and UK’s Starmer, Trump’s 2-week deadline opens a window of opportunity for diplomacy. Macron announced Friday that France, the UK and Germany, who have been speaking to the Iranians, will formally present Iran with a deal soon.
Whatever it is that Macron, Starmer and Merz have managed to arrive at will face several challenges.
First, it’s not clear what kind of buy-in they have from either the US or Israel, let alone Iran. This makes whatever proposal they come up with bold, but also unpredictable, and potentially unsustainable. With the pressure on Iran constantly evolving, it’s also possible that the Iranians don’t initially agree, then decide to agree down the line if things get existential in the following weeks and months.
Second, the hard truth here is that the EU lacks the leverage it needs to get Israel to agree to terms that it has not drafted itself. Moreover, the Europeans will need US backing for any deal, whether Israel is in or out. Then there’s Trump, who is eager to get his own deal done on literally anything foreign policy-related. He likely won’t be interested in any European-brokered deal unless it can be sold as his own.
All this makes an EU deal highly unlikely unless there is broad support from the Israelis and the Iranians, which would drastically shift the dynamic, essentially cutting out the Americans – again, highly unlikely.
That’s it for this week. I’m following this event very closely, so tune into these weekly briefings – or if you’re interested, you can also join my group of paid subscribers, where I break things down on a more granular basis during the week.
Great analysis!