Weekly Briefing: Trump Heads to the Middle East — and American Priorities Snap Into Focus
Trump's trip is about so much more than trillion-dollar deals.
While Ukraine remains locked in a stalemate, the Trump administration’s foreign policy compass is reorienting. And it’s pointing due south — toward Riyadh, not Kyiv.
This shift isn’t surprising.
With Ukraine’s frontlines frozen and political will waning in Washington, the Middle East now holds the keys to a more immediate set of foreign policy ambitions: a new regional order anchored by Israel and Saudi Arabia, bolstered by U.S. firepower (and great deals, of course).
Much of the groundwork has already been laid. Iran’s regional proxies, the Houthis, no longer have a working port (or airport), Hezbollah is weakened, and Hamas as a viable political structure in Gaza is almost gone. Iran itself is under direct military and diplomatic pressure, not to mention domestic strain. In short, the architecture for a U.S.-backed “post-Iran” Middle East is already being assembled — and Trump wants to be the one to cut the ribbon.
Trump’s itinerary tells us the story. The decision to visit Saudi Arabia first isn’t just symbolic. It reflects a layered strategic logic.
Trump sees a rare opening to re-ignite the Abraham Accords: the promise of a regional trilateral pact: Washington, Riyadh, and Jerusalem. In his view, such an alliance would not just be historic, but bulletproof. A united front of the U.S.’ two strongest regional allies would offer the kind of containment-by-consensus that Washington has been chasing since the Gulf War.
And crucially, it would allow the U.S. to do what every president since Obama has wanted: pivot to Asia and leave the Middle East in “friendly” hands.
Yes, this is still about China.
Neoclassical realism tells us that foreign policy behaviour is shaped not just by power dynamics, but by the perceptions and strategic cultures of political leaders. And what Trump sees, clearly, is the Indo-Pacific.
But you can’t pivot away if the region you’re leaving behind is unstable. A nuclear Iran, a resurgent Hamas, or a broader regional war would pull the U.S. right back in.
So, before exiting the stage, Trump wants to rearrange this theatre.
Iran’s nuclear programme and its deterrent potential stand in the way of regional consolidation. And while the shadow of Israeli pre-emption looms large, Tehran knows that even a negotiated deal might not shield it from an Israeli airstrike. That, too, is shaping its current posture.
What About Europe?
The Ukraine war is increasingly being seen through a different lens in Washington, as a “solved” problem in strategic terms. Not because it’s over, but because it no longer ranks as urgent.
In classic realist terms, the U.S. is facing multiple systemic constraints. The threat of war in Asia, instability in the Middle East, and fiscal pressure at home are all pulling against an indefinite U.S. commitment to Ukraine.
From a neoclassical realist perspective, this shift is more than pragmatic — it’s psychological. Trump and his circle perceive Europe as secure enough to survive without deep U.S. involvement. The pivot to Asia and the Middle East push is, in their view, not abandonment but prioritisation.
Still, Ukraine isn’t irrelevant, it’s just less useful. The administration may continue to use it rhetorically, especially to pressure NATO allies, but it no longer sits at the centre of U.S. strategic calculus.
The Verdict: Trump’s Middle East visit is more than a diplomatic pit stop. It’s a signal that U.S. foreign policy is entering a new phase: one where regional consolidation in the Gulf is a prerequisite for strategic disengagement, and ultimately, a rebalancing toward China. Europe may not be formally abandoned, but it will be de-centred. The U.S. is moving from global policeman to strategic editor: rewriting its commitments, redrawing its map of interest, and reordering its time.