Weekly Briefing: The US Asia-Pivot is Coming
As the Middle East winds down, the US will aim to recalibrate its strategic focus.
As I’m writing this, Israel is reviewing the updated terms of a ceasefire and hostage deal with Hamas. Whether or not this is the final iteration, a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas feels more likely than ever. With the 12-day Iran-Israel War over, a new government in Syria, and Iran’s proxies diminished, we may be on the verge of a sustained period of ‘relative’ calm across the region.
But where does this leave us…geopolitically speaking?
This wave of conflict across the Middle East reminds us that power is not just about hard material capabilities (military and economic power), but also about how those capabilities are perceived, mobilised, and constrained by domestic actors and institutions. In a world of limited resources, it’s also about priorities and bandwidth.
And the current US posture tells us something big is shifting.
Under Obama, Biden, and now increasingly the Trump administration, US foreign policy is converging on a singular geopolitical reality:
America cannot maintain indefinite attention on the Middle East and Ukraine while facing down China in the Indo-Pacific.
This is the underlying geopolitical logic behind Trump’s sudden push for a Middle East ceasefire. It’s about how the US perceives its own relative capabilities, not just in terms of raw power, but in terms of strategic bandwidth. Washington knows it can’t afford to stay bogged down on multiple fronts forever.
And that is exactly what worries China.
At the China-EU Dialogue in Brussels only a few days ago, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered a rare glimpse into Beijing’s strategic calculus: he warned that a Russian defeat in Ukraine would allow the US to redirect its attention (and resources) toward Asia. That’s the nightmare scenario for Beijing. A US no longer distracted by Ukraine or the Middle East would be free to concentrate its power projection across the Indo-Pacific.
From a neoclassical realist lens, it’s a perfect example of how perception of power, not just its raw distribution, drives strategic anxiety. China isn’t only worried about American strength. It fears American focus.
The US is (and has been for over a decade now) preparing to re-weight its global posture. That means delegating the regional security architecture of the Middle East. Not abandoning it, but outsourcing it.
Here’s an overview of what the US may be considering right now:
Contain Iran via regional balancing: a re-vitalised Abraham Accords, normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and an informal Gulf-Israeli security alignment.
Stabilise Syria by incentivising its slow reintegration into a non-Iranian regional order.
Sidestep Ukraine with a slow, managed freeze, pushing Europe to take more responsibility - empower France, Germany, Poland and the UK to take more collective action.
Pivot hard to Asia, focusing on Taiwan, the first island chain, and economic statecraft in the Indo-Pacific. Plus, re-energise the QUAD nations - especially cooperation with India.
America’s power is still vast, but its capacity to apply that power globally is constrained by domestic fatigue, partisan polarisation, and the rising urgency of the China challenge.
In Trump’s case, the prioritisation is even clearer. The return of “America First” doesn’t mean disengagement or isolationism in the traditional sense; rather, it means selective retrenchment and regional delegation - something I call neo-isolationism.
So, what’s next?
If this logic holds, expect a few key developments over the coming months:
1. A US-brokered regional framework between Israel and Saudi Arabia will resurface, not just as a peace accord, but as a new security architecture for the Middle East, with an expanded Abraham Accords at its centre.
2. Iran will continue to be isolated, not through war but by the growing incentives for its neighbours to stabilise and normalise without it. Any further development on its nuclear programme now seems to be off-limits, or it risks further US strikes.
3. Ukraine funding will slow to a trickle, unless a major strategic breakthrough occurs, as the political will in Washington dries up. Europe will likely step up and push Ukraine towards the negotiating table, slowly, but inevitably.
4. The US will shift focus east, with greater deployments to the Indo-Pacific, AUKUS expansions, and semiconductor protectionism ramping up.
None of this is guaranteed. In fact, anything could throw it off course. But the structural pressures are real, and the perception in Washington is that China is the pacing threat.
The inevitable US Asia Pivot will become the gravitational centre of current US foreign policy.
If you’ve made it this far, thanks for reading!
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