Europe Cannot Afford to Outsource Ukraine's Future to Washington

As an arbiter, Washington is both indispensable and deeply conflicted.

The war in Ukraine has reached a turning point.

Washington has assumed the lead role in peacemaking, with Donald Trump personally positioning himself as mediator and diplomatic go-between. Yet history shows the dangers when great powers blur their role between participant and arbiter. If Europe waits passively for Washington, it risks watching Ukraine’s future defined by American compromises or, worse, by Moscow’s dictates.

When great powers hesitate or equivocate, legitimacy collapses. The lesson of the 1930s remains clear: Britain’s failure to uphold red lines on German expansion into Czechoslovakia was not the result of military weakness but of deliberate inaction. In 2013, President Obama’s retreat from his own red line on chemical weapons in Syria repeated the pattern.

In both cases, hesitation cost lives and emboldened aggressors.

Europe now faces the same danger. If Washington falters in its role as mediator and does nothing, the legitimacy of this nascent peace process — and Ukraine’s future — will be at risk.

The issue is not whether Ukraine or the EU supports the process, even the Kremlin has shown some (very small) degree of openness to some form of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, barring NATO troops in Ukraine. It is rather the nature of the American role itself.

Under Biden, the U.S. was Ukraine’s most active backer. Under Trump, it has become a conflicted mediator, balancing Kyiv’s needs with Moscow’s demands.

The United States is no longer just a participant on Ukraine’s side; it has become both arbiter of peace and passive combatant in war. And in this role, Washington is both indispensable and deeply conflicted.

On one side, Trump is chasing a big win to define his second presidency. On the other side, the strategic implications of the Ukraine war being settled on Putin’s terms don’t actually favour Washington - or its allies. Trump faces a dual challenge: negotiate between the sides to bring an end to the war and do so on terms that are strategically favourable to America. For Trump, that likely means continued arms sales to Kyiv - a long-term military and strategic relationship encompassing drones to rare earths.

Trump’s dilemma is playing out in full view. His tense exchange with President Zelenskyy in Washington in March is case in point. Following that meeting, Trump shut down military aid to pressure Ukraine into accepting ceasefire terms. Then, after Ukraine agreed to the U.S.-proposed 30-day ceasefire following a meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Jeddah, the flow of aid resumed soon after – only to be briefly paused again, before Trump began to shift his tone on Ukraine come July. The same month, Trump greenlit the sale of US weapons (paid for by European NATO partners) to support Ukraine’s ongoing war effort.

When it comes to Russia, Trump has been more fluid and rhetorical, perhaps because the levers of power Trump has at his disposal against Russia are mostly exhausted – sanctions are already heaped on Moscow; even Trump himself admitted that financial penalties on Russia “may not work”.’

The stage-managed theatrics with Vladimir Putin in Alaska only serve to highlight the uncertainty about America’s true intentions. Is Washington still backing Ukraine’s sovereignty as a matter of principle, or is it veering toward a deal that suits the Trump administration’s hunger for a big win?

For Moscow, America’s new role is vindication of its current strategy - maintain maximalist demands at the diplomatic level as long as battlefield dynamics marginally favour Russian incremental advances - and play Brussels and Washington off each other. In this context, Vladimir Putin likely felt comfortable asking for far more than Kyiv or Brussels was ever willing to concede. The strategic win for Russia wouldn’t just be large swathes of Ukraine, but a firm wedge between Washington and Brussels.

Europe simply cannot afford to outsource its future security to this confusion or great power brinkmanship. If the United States is now seen as both participant and mediator, then Europe must step forward as the independent guarantor of Ukraine’s long-term future. That means more than rhetorical solidarity. It requires Europe to build its own peace architecture alongside American backstop efforts and to convene formats that reflect Europe’s stake in the conflict and its geopolitical future.

The venues exist. Istanbul, Doha, or even Delhi offer good offices where negotiations could take on a more balanced character. Turkey has a direct security interest in Ukraine’s future. India and Qatar maintain influence in Moscow that Washington and Brussels lack. Europe has been hesitant to look beyond the transatlantic framework, but if it wants a peace that reflects Ukraine’s aspirations as a European Union member state, then these formats must be activated. The Weimar+ and E3 groups offer ready-made structures for European diplomacy. They can be expanded and empowered to present a European framework for peace. Here’s how: